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Consent is the Key to Compel: The
Eighth Circuit Properly Denies a
Motion to Compel a Non-Signatory to
Arbitrate United States Court of
Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Bank of America v. UMB Financial Services
I. INTRODUCTION
This Note addresses a recent Eighth Circuit decision concerning the issue of
whether or not to compel arbitration between a non-signatory plaintiff and a de-
fendant who desires to arbitrate the plaintiff's claims.' After examining a recent
Supreme Court decision in which the Court articulated certain principles of state
contract law that allow a court to compel arbitration by or against nonparties to a
contract, this Note will explore precedent in Missouri that demonstrates a stringent
process in order to compel non-signatories to arbitration. The various federal cir-
cuit court treatments of this commonly litigated issue and its underlying split on
the topic will also be addressed, as the issue is one typically decided based on the
circumstances of the particular case. Based on the facts of the case, this Note will
argue that the Eighth Circuit sensibly did not compel arbitration because the cir-
cumstances did not support any particular state contract law theory. Also, this
Note will address the most practical way to compel arbitration against a non-
signatory and the negative implications that could ensue if courts freely compel
arbitration by or against non-signatories without proper procedure between con-
tracting parties.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The parties involved in this case, decided in the Eight Circuit, include Bank
of America (BOA), UMB Financial Services (UMB), and five former financial
advisors of BOA (Advisors). 2 BOA employed Sheryl Bolsilevac, Elizabeth C.
Brown, Aaron Isralite, Amy Pieper, and Molly Kerr as financial advisors for its
"high-net-worth clients," but the Advisors decided to terminate their employment
with BOA to pursue employment with UMB. 3 They were all paid a salary by
BOA and also received securities-related sales commissions from Bank of Amer-
ica Investment Services (BOAIS).4 BOAIS is a subsidiary of BOA which con-
1. Bank of America v. UMB Financial Servs., Inc., 618 F.3d 906, 910 (8th Cir. 2010).
2. Id. at 908.
3. Id. at 908-09.
4. Id. at 908.
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ducts business in investment of securities.5 As part of their employment agree-
ment, the Advisors were bound by a non-solicitation clause which prohibited them
from soliciting BOA customers for a period of time if they discontinued employ-
ment with BOA. 6 Bosilevac, Brown, and Pieper signed non-solicitation agree-
ments for a one-year term that referred to both BOA and BOAIS; Israelite and
Kerr's non-solicitation agreements referred only to BOA and contained a six-
month term.7
The Advisors discontinued their work with BOA in the spring of 2009 and
started working for UMB.8 Despite the fact that the employees did not sell securi-
ties in the course of their employment with UMB, BOA believed that the former
advisors were soliciting customers from BOA, violating the non-solicitation
agreements.9 Counsel for BOA sent a letter to UMB demanding the company stop
any solicitation efforts by the employees.'o BOA subsequently filed suit on July
27, 2009 to enforce all five agreements and to seek damages." BOAIS was not
included as a party in BOA's suit and did not bring any claims against the advi-
sors.12 In an effort to prevent any additional client loss during litigation, BOA
filed a temporary restraining order against UMB, which the district court immedi-
ately granted.13 In response, UMB attempted to dismiss the case on failure to join
BOAIS as a necessary party and for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.14 In addition to both motions, UMB also filed a statement of
claim with the Financial Services Regulatory Authority (FINRA).
UMB filed a statement of claim with FINRA to commence arbitration pro-
ceedings against BOA and BOAIS.' 6 As part of the Securities and Exchange Act
(SEA), FINRA regulates the securities industry pursuant to an agreement between
banks that agree to form a membership with FINRA, or member entities, and ap-
proval by the Securities and Exchange Commission.' As its source of regulation,
FINRA has its own Code of Arbitration for disputes between the member banks
and between the member banks and their employees.'8 UMB Financial Services is
a member of FINRA but BOA is not.'9
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Bank ofAmerica, 618 F.3d at 908-909.





13. Bank of America, 618 F.3d at 909.
14. Id.
15. Id. ("FINRA is the organization that issued licenses to Bosilevac, Brown, Pieper, and Israelite to
broker securities. FINRA was formed by consolidation of NYSE Regulation, Inc. .. . and the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. . . . FINRA is a private entity, part of the system of self-
regulation set up under the [Securities and Exchange Act].").
16. Id.
17. Id.; FINRA, MANDATORY FINRA MEMBERSHIP FOR NYSE MEMBER
ORGANIZATIONS, Notice to Members 07-52, WL 3311531, at *4 (Nov. 2, 2007) ("The term "mem-
ber organization" also includes a registered broker or dealer that is a member of FINRA, which does
not own a trading license and agrees to be regulated by the Exchange as a member organization and
which the Exchange has agreed to regulate.").
18. Bank of America, 618 F.3d at 909 ("[Elach member of FINRA agrees by membership, to submit
to arbitration if a "dispute arises out of the business activities of a member or an associated person and
466 [Vol. 2011
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In an effort to dispel UMB Financial's arbitration demand and substitute a
non-FINRA entity, BOA requested leave of the district court to substitute UMB
Bank, a non-FINRA entity, as defendant. 20 Pursuant to the FINRA provisions,
UMB asked the district court to compel BOA to participate in arbitration. 2' The
district court denied the motion to compel "without prejudice" and expressed its
intent to adequately consider the issues before it.22 However, as a result of this
limited and non-specific ruling, FINRA sent the district court a letter stating that it
would conduct arbitration between UMB and the five former BOA employees,
along with BOAIS, unless the district court gave an order enjoining the arbitra-
tion.23 In response to this letter, the district court entered an order sua sponte en-
joining the parties from arbitrating their dispute until the court ruled otherwise.24
The next day, UMB appealed both the district court order denying the motion to
compel arbitration and the order enjoining the arbitration 25 UMB also requested a
stay of the district court proceedings pending resolution of the appeal.26
As an attempt to preserve its preliminary injunction, BOA moved to extend
its previous temporary restraining order in regard to the Advisor's solicitation
attempts. 27 After receiving an extension, BOA subsequently appealed to the
Eighth Circuit to dismiss all of the UMB appeals.28 The Eighth Circuit denied its
motion to dismiss.29 After denying UMB's dispositive motions, the district court
decided to join BOAIS as a necessary party.30 After this ruling, UMB moved to
compel arbitration with BOAIS and renewed its motion to compel with BOA.
BOAIS disputed its inclusion as a necessary party, stating "it had no claims in the
litigation" and it attempted to waive "any claims that could arise out of the subject
matter of the litigation."32 The district court denied UMB's new motions to com-
pel arbitration with BOAIS and BOA.33 Furthermore, the district court granted
BOA's request for a preliminary injunction.34 This restrained the employees with
non-solicitation agreements from violating them any further and prevented UMB
from doing business with any customers gained in violation of the agreements. 35
is between or among: Members; Members and Associated Persons; or Associated Persons." "Associ-
ated persons" are defined under the FINRA code as individuals who are registered with FINRA,
whereas "members" refers to the organizations regulated by FINRA.").
19. Id.
20. Id. ("BOA claims none of the individual defendants, except for Pieper, work for UMB Financial
and requested leave of the district court to substitute UMB Bank (a non-FINRA entity) as defendant.
That motion is stayed along with the rest of the district court proceedings pending the outcome of these
appeals.").
21. Id. at 909-10.
22. Id. at 910.
23. Id.
24. Bank ofAmerica, 618 F.3d at 910.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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In its appeal to the Eighth Circuit, UMB only addressed the question of
"whether the district court should have compelled BOA and BOAIS to arbitrate in
the FINRA proceedings." 36 Additionally, UMB appealed the district court's deci-
sion to enjoin the parties from proceeding with the FINRA arbitration. 37 The
Eighth Circuit held that BOA could not be compelled to arbitrate its dispute be-
cause BOA is not a FINRA member and a party can not be forced to arbitrate an
agreement which it did not originally agree to arbitrate. 38 Furthermore, the circuit
court refuted UMB's argument that BOA and BOAIS were inextricably inter-
twined under the FINRA arbitration agreement, and stated they were only inextri-
cably intertwined under the employment contract. 39 Finally, the circuit court held
that BOA is not a third party beneficiary to any of the FINRA membership con-
tracts because it did not derive a benefit from them and thus could not be com-
pelled to arbitrate based on its third party affiliation with BOAIS.40
m. LEGAL HISTORY & BACKGROUND
A. Arbitration Agreements Enforced Against Non-signatories by
Incorporation
In Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle41 , the Supreme Court reviewed a court of
appeal determination that those who are not ?arties to a written arbitration agree-
ment are "categorically ineligible for relief."4 After briefly reviewing the substan-
tive Section 2 mandate of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the Court noted how
Section 3 allows litigants, who are already in court, to invoke prior agreements
made enforceable by Section 2 in an effort to stay the litigation and resolve
whether a dispute should be submitted to arbitration.43
Because neither sections of the FAA purported to determine the scope of a
non-party in litigation to compel arbitration, the Court articulated that state law is
applicable to determine which contracts are binding under Section 2 and enforce-
able under Section 3.4 After determining the state law's purpose, the Court con-
cluded that "traditional principles" of state law allow a contract to be enforced by
or against nonparties to the contract through "assumption, piercing the corporate
veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party beneficiary theories, waiver
and estoppel."45 As a result of this articulation of state law contract principles
36. Bank ofAmerica, 618 F.3d at 910.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 911-912.
39. Id. at 912- 913 (citing Dunn Indus. Grp. v. Lafarge Corp., 112 S.W.3d 421, 436-37 (Mo. 2003)
("[T]he estoppel cases were based on actions inextricably intertwined with the contract containing the
arbitration agreement, not the collateral contract sought to be enforced.").
40. Bank ofAmerica, 618 F.3d at 913-14.
41. 129 S.Ct. 1896 (2009).
42. Id. at 1901.
43. Id. at 1901-02.
44. Id. at 1902 (quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n. 9 (1987))("[S]tate law, therefore, is
applicable to determine which contracts are binding under § 2 and enforceable under § 3 if that law
arose to govern issues concerning the validty, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally").
45. Id. (quoting 21 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 57:19 12 (4th ed. 2001)).
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permitting enforcement of contracts by or against nonparties, the Supreme Court
ruled that the Sixth Circuit's holding relating to Section 3 was error. 46
In response to the respondent's argument that claims to arbitration by nonpar-
ties are not referable to arbitration because they try to enforce an obligation not
within the signatory's actual agreement, the Court looked to a canon interpreta-
tion.47 The Court noted that stays of litigation are required if the claims are "refer-
able to arbitration under an agreement in writing." 48 Based on its statutory inter-
pretation, the Court concluded that enforcement of an arbitration provision by or
against a third party is possible under state contract law.49 Thus, the Court stated a
third-party claim is referable to arbitration where state law permits. 50
However, in 2002. the Court addressed the related issue of whether a signa-
tory can compel arbitration against a non-signatory in EEOC v. Waffle House,
Inc. 5 The Court held that, at least where the EEOC is the non-signatory and is
suing on behalf of a signatory to an employment agreement containing an arbitra-
tion clause, the employer cannot compel the EEOC to arbitrate.52 Although this
case does not directly address the issue contemplated by this Note, the Court reaf-
firmed the FAA's pro-arbitration policy and the principle of contractual consent:
"The FAA directs courts to place arbitration agreements on equal footing with
other contracts, but it 'does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not
agreed to do so."" In other words, the FAA policy favoring arbitration applies to
ambiguous agreements but not where there is a lack of agreement.
B. The Necessity of Incorporation by Reference to Enforce Arbitration
Agreements in Missouri
In an attempt to determine the scope of an agreement to arbitrate against a
non-signatory party, the Supreme Court of Missouri addressed the issue relating to
a construction contract in Dunn Industrial Group, Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek.54
The court held that a third party guarantor could not be bound by an agreement to
arbitrate in a construction contract it did not sign, because the contract in which it
was a signatory did not incorporate the arbitration provision of the construction
contract at issue.55 Lafarge contracted with Dunn Industrial Group, Inc. (DIG) for
the design and construction of a new cement plant and included an arbitration
clause within the contract.56 DIG's parent company, Dunn Industries, Inc. (Dunn)
signed a contract guaranty promising DIG's performance of its obligations under
46. Id. ("[Tlhe Sixth's Circuit's holding that nonparties to a contract are categorically barred from
Section 3 relief was error.").
47. Arthur Anderson, 129 S.Ct. at 1902.
48. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006)).
49. Id. at 1902 ('[I]f a written arbitration provision is made enforceable against (or for the benefit
of) a third party under state contract law, the statute's terms are fulfilled.").
50. Id. at 1902 n. 6.
51. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
52. Id. at 281, 288-89, 291-96.
53. Id. at 293 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468,478 (1989)).
54. 112 S.W.3d 421 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
55. Id. at 436.
56. Id. at 426-27.
469No. 2]
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the construction contract with Lafarge.5 7 After disputes and litigation arose against
Lafarge for mechanic's lien claims, Lafarge successfully compelled arbitration
against DIG, its original contract partner, but the Missouri Supreme Court de-
clined to compel arbitration against Dunn, the non-signatory. Despite limiting
the scope of an arbitration agreement against a non-signatory guarantor, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court compromised with the strong federal policy in favor of arbi-
tration.
The court expanded the scope somewhat by noting that a majority of state
courts enforce arbitration against a non-signatory when parties incorporate an
arbitration agreement by reference into a separate guaranty or performance bond.6
Specifically, the court noted that where the agreement specifically incorporated by
reference an arbitration provision, subcontractors, acting as non-signatories, were
subject to the arbitration provision. However, the courts compelled arbitration in
certain cases because the incorporation by reference method was effectively dem-
onstrated.62 As an example of its stringent requirements for incorporation by ref-
erence, the Supreme Court of Missouri in Dunn noted that "mere reference to the
construction contract in the guaranty is insufficient" to establish that a third party
guarantor bound itself to an arbitration provision of a separate contract. 63
C. Arbitration Agreements Enforced Against Non-signatories through
Estoppel and Inextricable Intertwinement in Missouri
Just as the Missouri Supreme Court denied the scope of arbitration against a
third party unless the contract in which it was a signatory specifically incorporated
or referenced the applicable arbitration provision, it also denied the scope of arbi-
tration against a third party under an estoppel theory.6 Despite denying both the
guaranty incorporation and estoppel theory against Dunn, the court did note that
there were cases in which arbitration agreements were enforced on a theory of
estoppel. In the cases where a theory of estoppel arose, the highly related issues
of the non-signatory's arbitration claim estopped the signatories, who were parties
to contracts including an arbitration agreement, from avoiding arbitration.' The
57. Id. at 427.
58. See Dunn, 112 S.W.3d at 432-37.
59. See Dunn, 112 S.W.3d at 435.
60. Id. ("[Iln a majority of state courts, including Missouri, due to strong federal policy in favor of
arbitration, arbitration agreements are enforced against guarantors or sureties where the arbitration
agreement is incorporate into the guaranty or performance bond.").
61. Id. at 435 n. 5 (citing Jim Carlson Const., Inc. v. Bailey, 769 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Mo. App. W.D.
1989); See also Metro Demolition & Excavating Co. v. H.B.D. Contracting, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 843, 847
(Mo. Ct. App. 2001); Sheffield Assembly of God Church, Inc. v. American Ins. Co., 870 S.W.2d 926,
931 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)).
62. Dunn, 112 S.W.3d at 436 (in those cases, documents containing the arbitration provisions were
specifically incorporated by reference into the other contracts).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 436-37.
65. Id. at 436 (citing J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315 (4th Cir.
1988)); McBro Planning & Dev. Co. v. Triangle Elec. Constr. Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 342 (11th Cir.
1984)).
66. Dunn, 112 S.W.3d at 436 ("[S]ignatories to contracts containing an arbitration agreement were
estopped when the issues the non-signatories were seeking to resolve in arbitration were intertwined
with the agreement signed by the signatory.").
470 [Vol. 2011
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court noted that the claims were "integrally related to the contract containing the
arbitration provision."67
Although the court noted the possibility of an estoppel theory in Dunn, it dis-
tinguished auxiliary agreements that involve isolated conditions and responsibili-
ties, such as third party guaranty agreements, as not "integrally related" to a con-
struction contract with an arbitration clause.68 Thus, the estoppel cases were based
on actions inextricably intertwined with the contract containing the arbitration
69
agreement, not the collateral contract sought to be enforced. However, the court
did not explore the extent to which the claims have to be intertwined in order to
find an estoppel theory.70
In relation to the benefits from the contract it sought to enforce, the Missouri
Supreme Court has always adhered to long-standing contract principles, as alluded
to in Dubail v. Medical West Bldg. Corp.1 In Dubail, the court stated the rule
governing situations where actions by one party in accepting benefits of one con-
tract leads to the inability to avoid the obligations imposed by other terms.7 As a
general contract principle, a person may be estopped from questioning the exis-
tence, validity, and effect of a contract by accepting benefits.73 Essentially, con-
tract law does not allow a party to claim benefits afforded to it by contract and
then proceed to bypass its duties and encumbrances. 74 Consistent with the contract
principles outlined, the Dunn court held that Dunn did not accept the benefits of
the construction contract because it only pointed to a provision within the alleged
contract containing the arbitration provision to avoid guaranty liability. 5 Thus,
since Dunn did not agree to arbitrate its liability as guarantor or accept any bene-
fits of the contract between Lafarge and DIG, Dunn was not required to arbitrate
any claims with Lafarge.76
D. Arbitration Agreements Enforced Against Non-signatories through
Third Party Beneficiary Status in Missouri
The Supreme Court of Missouri addressed an appeal from a judgment over-
ruling motions to compel arbitration and stay litigation and visited the issue of
third party non-signatories and arbitration in Nitro Distributing, Inc. v. Dunn.77
The parties appealing the judgment were the Amway Corporation (Amway) dis-
tributors and its related entities who sought to compel arbitration with Nitro and
67. Id.
68. Id. at 436-37 ("[Wihile the contract guaranty signed by Dunn guarantees DIG's prompt and
satisfactory performance of the construction contract between Lafarge and DIG, it is a collateral
agreement for another's undertaking and is an independent contract that imposes different responsibili-
ties from those imposed in the construction contract between Lafarge and DIG.").
69. Id.
70. See generally Dunn Indust. Grp., Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek, t 12 S.W.3d 421 (Mo. 2003).
71. 372 S.W.2d 128, 132 (Mo. 1963).
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting 31 C.J.S. Estoppel & Waiver § 110 (2011)).
74. Dubail, 372 S.W.2d at 132 ("[A] party will not be allowed to assume the inconsistent position of
affirming a contract in party by accepting or claiming its benefits, and disaffirming it in part by repudi-
ating or avoiding its obligations, or burdens."); see also 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 521 (2011).
75. Dunn, 112 S.W.3d at 436-37.
76. Id. at 437.
77. 194 S.W.3d 339, 343 (Mo. 2006) (en banc).
No. 2] 471
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West Palm, companies owned by an Amway distributor.78 However, neither Nitro
nor West Palm was signatories to any agreement with Amway. 79 Amway at-
tempted to bind Nitro and West Palm as third party beneficiaries to an Amway
distributorship agreement with Ken Stewart, another party involved in the dis-
pute.80
The court articulated the law with regard to third-party beneficiaries in Ni-
tro. If a party is bound as a third-party beneficiary, intent relating to the contract
terms' manifest purpose to benefit that party is expressly shown.82 In cases where
the contract language does not embody that manifest purpose, "there is a strong
presumption that the third party is not a beneficiary and that the parties contracted
to benefit only themselves."83 Furthermore, as an example of its strict interpreta-
tion, the court articulated that "a mere incidental benefit to the third party is insuf-
ficient to bind that party."84 In relation to Nitro, the court held that there was a
lack of intent to benefit Nitro and West Palm and the only benefit to them was
incidental. Relying on this general stance, the court found that Nitro and West
Palm were not third party beneficiaries. The court did not allude to what extent
the benefit exceeds incidental and becomes substantial enough to find third party
beneficiary status.87
E. The Circumstances Required to Bind Non-Signatories to Arbitration in
the Federal Courts
Although the Eighth Circuit found that BOA had not extracted any benefit
from the FINRA form U-4 and thus could not be compelled to arbitrate according
to Missouri law, a number of federal courts have explicitly mentioned the re-
quirements to bind non-signatories. In Gersten v. Intrinsic Technologies, LLP,89
a non-signatory, who had relied upon provisions of an agreement as a basis for its
recovery but denied that it was bound by the arbitration provision of the same
contract, was required to arbitrate.90 The defendants, Intrinsic Technologies,
moved to stay proceedings pending the result of its requested arbitration against
Plaintiff, Robert Gersten, pursuant to the Operating Agreement.9 Intrinsic argued
78. Id. at 343-344.
79. Id. at 345.
80. Id.
8 1. Id.
82. Id. (citing Peters v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 853 S.W.2d 300, 301 (Mo. 1993) (en banc))("[T]o
be bound as a third-party beneficiary, the terms of the contract must clearly express intent to benefit
that party or an identifiable class of which the party is a member.").
83. Nitro, 194 S.W.3d at 345 (citing State ex rel. William Ranni Assocs, Inc. v. Hartenbach, 742
S.W.2d 134, 141 (Mo. 1987) (en banc)).
84. Id. (citing Hartenbach, 742 S.W.2d at 140).
85. Nitro, 194 S.W.3d at 345.
86. Id.
87. See generally Nitro Distributing, Inc. v. Dunn 194 S.W.3d 339 (Mo. 2006) (en banc).
88. Camp v. TNT Logistics Corp., (No. 04-1358), 2006 WL 91318 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2006); Gersten
v. Intrinsic Technologies, LLP, 442 F. Supp. 2d 573, 579 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Hughes Masonry Co. v.
Greater Clark County Sch. Bldg. Corp., 659 F.2d 836, 839 (7th Cir. 1981).
89. 442 F. Supp. 2d 573 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
90. Id. at 581.
91. Id. at 576.
[Vol. 2011472
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that because Plaintiffs suit attempts to declare rights arising under and predicated
upon that agreement, the lawsuit must be submitted to arbitration.92
Gersten argued that the arbitration clause did not apply to him because he was
not a signatory to the Operating Agreement. 93 The court held in compliance with
the estoppel doctrine that a party's attempt to avoid an arbitration clause within a
certain document while concurrently reaping the benefits of that contract which
contains the arbitration clause is improper.94 However, in limiting this estoppel
application, the court noted that the foundation of this estoppel theory is "whether
the non-signatory has brought suit against the signatory premised upon the agree-
ment that contains the arbitration clause at issue, thus seeking the agreement's
direct benefits."95
The benefit, however, must be direct; attenuated and indirect benefits are in-
sufficient to force arbitration under an estoppel theory. 96 In Zurich, Zurich, the
insurer, argued that Jones, a non-si natory, was bound to arbitrate issues respect-
ing certain deductible agreements. As a basis for its arbitration claim, Zurich
declared that Jones' relationship to its parent company, Watts, as its wholly owned
subsidiary restrained Jones to the agreements.98 Furthermore, Zurich claimed that
Jones was subject to arbitration because Jones utilized benefits associated with the
deductible agreements. 99 In its analysis of the facts related to the law of the estop-
pel theory, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Jones did not seek or call upon any
rights under the deductible agreements or derive any direct benefit.'" In an effort
to define a benefit too indirect based on the estoppel theory, the court mentioned
that Jones' assumed lower insurance premiums based on the deductible agree-
ments would not compel Jones to arbitrate.' 0' Thus, there were no grounds for
compelling the non-signatory to arbitrate.10 2
The Seventh Circuit explicitly stated that "arbitration is contractual by nature,
and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has
not agreed so to submit." 0 3 Despite the basic consensual agreement required to
arbitrate, the court did state five contract doctrines which courts have used to bind
a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement to arbitrate: "(1) assumption; (2)
agency; (3) estoppel; (4) veil piercing; and (5) incorporation by reference"1 Zu-
rich attempted to establish that since Jones was a wholly owned subsidiary of
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 579 (citing Hughes Masonry Co., 659 F.2d at 838).
95. Gersten, 442 F.Supp. 2d at 579.
96. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Watts Indus., 417 F.3d 682, 688 (7th Cir. 2005).
97. Id. at 687.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 688.
101. Id. ("[E]ven assuming that Jones has benefitted from the deductible agreements by paying lower
insurance premiums based on the deductibles, this benefit is too attenuated and indirect to force arbi-
tration under an estoppel theory.").
102. Zurich, 417 F.3d at 688.
103. Id. at 687.
104. Id. (citing Fyrnetics (H.K.) Ltd. v. Quantum Group, Inc., 293 F.3d 1023, 1029 (7th Cir. 2002)
("[Tihere are five doctrines through which a non-signatory can be bound by arbitration agreements
entered into by others: (1) assumption; (2) agency; (3) estoppel; (4) veil piercing; and (5) incorporation
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Watts, Jones should be required to arbitrate based on its status.o The court did
not agree with Zurich's claim and interpretation and ruled that any form of agency
or alter ego theory was not met because "a mere parent-subsidiary relationshiN
does not create the relation of principal and agent or alter ego between the two."
Thus, the court concluded that a party cannot compel a subsidiary to arbitrate
based only on the parent's signature to an arbitration agreement. 0 7
The Seventh Circuit's treatment of this estoppel theory is consistent with sub-
stantial federal appellate authority from other circuits. os In Washington Mutual
Fin. Group, LLC v. Bailey, the Fifth Circuit endorsed the reasoning of the Fourth
Circuit in Int'l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH.'0
Applying the estoppel theory principle, the Fifth Circuit held that application of
the estoppel doctrine was appropriate to prevent the non-signatory plaintiff from
taking "inconsistent positions" in "suing based upon one part of transaction that
she says grants her rights while simultaneously attempting to avoid other parts of
the same transaction that she views as a burden, namely the arbitration agree-
ment." 10
The United States District Court in the Northern District of Illinois in Gersten
also relied on this analysis and used it as a way to harmonize its facts with Wash-
ington Mutual in order to compel a non-signatory to arbitrate.' Specifically, the
court noted that the Gersten did seek to invoke significant rights under the Operat-
ing Agreement involved in the parties' dispute, which contained a broad arbitra-
tion provision. 112 As an owner of interest in the company, Gersten sought annual
financial distributions and the right to inspect the core books and records of the
Company seeking to compel arbitration." 3 Thus, if Gersten, the Plaintiff, wished
to invoke the benefits of rights conferred by the Operating Agreement, the Plain-
tiff must also abide by the arbitration provision, which is explicitly within the
same Operating Agreement that confers benefits to the Plaintiff. 4
F. The Effect of a Lack of Incorporation by Reference when Considering
Two Separate Agreements
The court in Zurich noted estoppel and incorporation by reference as distinct
bases by which a non-signatory can be compelled to arbitrate claims." 5 Two Sev-
enth Circuit cases offer thorough analysis of how the lack of incorporation by
reference will force a court to not compel arbitration against a non-signatory,
105. Zurich, 417 F.3d at 687.
106. Id. (quoting Caligiuri v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 742 N.E.2d 750, 756 (111. App. Ct. 2000)).
107. Id. ("[A] corporate relationship is generally not enough to bind a non-signatory to an arbitration
agreement.").
108. See American Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d 349 (2d Cir. 1999); Int'l
Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2000); Washington
Mutual Fin Group, LLC v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2004).
109. See Washington Mutual, 364 F.3d at 267-68 (quoting Int'l Paper Co., 206 F.3d at 418)).
110. Id. at 268.
111. Gersten, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 582 n.4.
112. Id. at 583.
113. Id. at582.
114. Id.
115. See Zurich, 417 F.3d at 687.
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which is precisely the outcome of Bank of America.'16 In Rosenblum v. Travel-
byus.com Ltd., the Seventh Circuit addressed whether an employment agreement's
arbitration clause governs and applies to the action of the acquisition agree-
ment." 7 The court noted there were two potential origins of Rosenblum's obliga-
tion to arbitrate the dispute.' 18 First, if the arbitration clause within the employ-
ment agreement arbitration clause was broad enough to cover disputes arising
from the subsequent acquisition agreement, then Travelbyus could have required
Rosenblum to arbitrate."l 9 Second, an obligation to arbitrate is necessary if the
subsequent acquisition agreement incorporates the employment agreement by
reference. 120
The court found that the two contracts were not part of the same agreement,
and were "separate, free-standing contracts. "" Through its logic, the court stated
that "one contract may be fully performed while the other is breached." 22 In es-
sence, the court reasoned that Rosenblum could fully perform one contract but be
subject to a breach of the other, so the court was unable to find that the parties
intended that the terms of the employment agreement to apply to disputes arising
under the acquisition agreement.' 23
In regard to the law on incorporation by reference, the court construed Illinois
law since it is a matter of contract interpretation. 124 As the general rule, "the con-
tract must show an intent to incorporate the other document and make it part of
the contract itself." 25 The court limited its interpretation to the four corners of the
contract.126 The defendant, Travelbyus.com, argued that the merger clause located
within the acquisition agreement incorporated the employment agreement.127 The
court distinguished identification within a contract from the intent to incorporate
another contract's provisions when it denied the defendant's incorporation by
reference argument.128 Following similar logic as the Eighth Circuit did in Bank of
America, the court noted that "mere reference to another contract or document is
not sufficient to incorporate its terms into a contract."l29 The court required an
express intent to incorporate and, since there was no such expression within these
two agreements, denied the incorporation by reference argument as a matter of
law.130
116. See Rosenblum v. Travelbyus.com Ltd., 299 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2002); Grundstad v. Ritt, 106
F.3d 201 (7th Cir. 1997).




121. Id. at 663.
122. Id.
123. Rosenblum, 299 F.3d at 663
124. Id. at 662.
125. Id. at 663.
126. Id. at 664.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 664-66.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit articulated that the question of whether a dis-
pute should be arbitrated under a contract is one of contract interpretation.' The
court did not analyze a separate issue concerning whether the arbitrator decides if
a dispute should be arbitrated because UMB argued the issue for the first time in
their reply brief.132 Since the dispute was a diversity action, the court applied the
substantive law of Missouri, the forum state.' 33
In regard to the employment contracts the Advisors signed, the Eighth Circuit
determined that the non-solicitation agreements at issue did not contain arbitration
clauses.1 34 The court's only finding of any applicable arbitration provision was
within the FINRA form U-4.135 All members of FINRA execute a form U-4,
which includes an arbitration agreement "between members, members and associ-
ated persons, and associated persons."'36 However, the court poignantly noted that
since BOA is not a FINRA member, it did not consent to be held accountable to
the terms of FINRA's arbitration agreement between members.' 37 Additionally,
BOA could not hire FINRA members in their FINRA capacities because it was
not a member of FINRA. 138 As a dispositive fact for affirming the district court
ruling, the Eighth Circuit stressed the fact that the parties failed to assert any type
of argument regarding incorporation of the FINRA arbitration agreement terms. 139
In order for UMB to compel arbitration with BOA, the court noted that the em-
ployment agreement needed to "inco4 orate the arbitration clause of the FINRA
contracts by reference or otherwise."'
After reviewing the substantive law of Missouri regarding the possibility to
enforce a contract against a non-signatory based on inextricable intertwinement,
the Eighth Circuit found Dunn to be similar and a pertinent analogous case. 141 As
a matter of law, the Eighth Circuit applied similar reasoning to the Missouri
court's rejection that inextricability of facts permitted the court to bind a non-
signing party to arbitration where that party had not agreed to arbitration in any
manner.142 Specifically, the court mentioned how BOA's claims were "inextrica-
bly intertwined with BOAIS's under the employment contract and not intertwined
with the FINRA arbitration agreements." 43 Thus, due to the lack of any eviden-
tiary force that the FINRA membership agreements benefitted BOA in any way or
131. BankofAmerica,618 F.3d at 911.
132. Id. at 911 n. 3 ("[W]e would not consider the question in any case, as it was argued for the first
time in a reply brief.").
133. Id. at911.
134. Id. at 911-12.
135. Id. at912.
136. Id. (The members agreed to arbitrate if a "dispute arises out of the business activities of a mem-
ber or an associated person and is between or among: Members, Members and Associated Persons, or
Associated Persons.").
137. Bank of America, 618 F.3d at 912 ("[BOA is not a FINRA member and did not directly agree to
subject itself to arbitration under FINRA's terms.").
138. Id. at 913-14.
139. Id. at 912.
140. Id. at 913.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Bank ofAmerica, 618 F.3d at 913.
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that BOA expressed an intention to benefit from the FINRA agreements, the
Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court did not err when it denied the mo-
tion to compel BOA to arbitrate." Essentially, the Eighth Circuit adhered to the
consensual agreement requirement between two parties as a condition to enforce
an arbitration provision and found BOA had not agreed in writing or otherwise so
it could not be compelled to do so.145
Finally, in order to clear any necessary involvement of BOAIS in the current
dispute amongst BOA, UMB Financial, and the Advisors, the Eighth Circuit men-
tioned how BOAIS waived all claims related to the litigation or resulting from the
employment agreements and non-solicitation clauses. 146 Furthermore, the court
stated that UMB and the Advisors did not assert any claims against BOAIS.147 For
these reasons, the Eighth Circuit concluded that BOAIS could not be compelled to
arbitrate either because there were no claims pending between BOAIS, UMB, and
the Advisors.148
V. COMMENT
According to Professor Charles Knapp, one of the most litigated contract is-
sues is whether or not to enforce a written arbitration agreement in a contract
agreement.149 In Bank of America, the Eighth Circuit decided this common issue
among contracting parties and eventually denied UMB's request to compel arbi-
tration.150 A pivotal issue the courts try to answer when faced with a contract dis-
pute is whether a consensual agreement occurred between the parties involved in
the dispute.' ' Consent is also an important prerequisite to the Supreme Court in
terms of their consideration to compel arbitration.' 52 As the Court has decided,
"[a]rbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion."' 53 Courts use the
canons of state law contract creation to determine whether the parties involved in
a dispute acknowledged consent to arbitrate an issue.154 Despite the FAA's policy
to promote arbitration process, the lack of one party's consent to arbitrate will
cause another party's potential motion to compel to fail pursuant to state contract
interpretation.155





149. Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 763 (2002).
150. Bank of America,618 F.3d at 914.
151. Frank Z. LaForge, Inequitable Estoppel: Arbitrating with Nonsignatory Defendants Under
Grigson v. Creative Artists, 84 TEX. L. REV. 225, 229 (2005).
152. Jaime Dodge Byrnes, Elizabeth Pollman, Arbitration, Consent and Contractual Theory: The
Implications of EEOC v. Waffle House, 8 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 289, 289 (2003) ("[Tihe Supreme
Court has consistently required consent as a precondition for compelling arbitration.").
153. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
154. LaForge, supra note 146 at 229.
155. Id. at 230 ("[Hlence, if state contract formation law determines that the parties at hand have not
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Rather than focusing on the extent and interpretations of BOA's claims
against UMB, the Eighth Circuit prudently adhered to contractual foundations and
decided to mainly focus on BOA's lack of consent to arbitration. BOA's lack of
consent or even awareness of the arbitration clause within the FINRA membership
agreement precluded the possibility that BOA should be compelled to arbitrate its
unrelated claim against UMB and the Advisors.156 Although the Eighth Circuit
denied UMB's request to compel arbitration, the court did articulate various ways
contracting parties can compel a non-signatory party to arbitrate.'57 Based on this
authority, incorporation of the arbitration clause by reference in a contract in
which the non-signatory is a signatory can offer the most predictable, persuasive,
and efficient method to force a non-signatory to arbitrate future claims.
A. Incorporation by Reference: The Most Efficient and Fair Method to
Compel a Non-signatory to Arbitrate Claims
Incorporation by reference can be the most discernible contract provision to
successfully bind a non-signatory to an arbitration clause within another contract
document.' However, according to J. Douglas Uloth & J. Hamilton Rial, I,
some courts determine that incorporation by reference is not a valid method to
bind a non-signatory "unless the incorporated arbitration clause itself contains
language broad enough to allow non-signatories' disputes to be brought within its
terms."'59 Broadly worded arbitration clauses can incorporate a non-signatory
when the language within the clause is not limited to the named parties specifi-
cally identified in the agreement.'1o For instance, the use of arbitration clauses that
refer to "contracting parties" instead of referring to the parties by name are con-
sidered broad and "may bind non-signatories to arbitration when the agreement or
contract is referenced by an incorporation clause."' 61 Additionally, as a strong pre-
requisite basis to the equitable estoppel theory, most courts that have compelled
156. See Bank ofAmerica, 618 F.3d at 912-913.
157. Id.
158. See I DOMKE ON COM. ARB. § 13:4 (3d ed. 2003).
159. J. Douglas Uloth & J. Hamilton Rial, Ill, Equitable Estoppel As A Basis for Compelling Nonsig-
natories to Arbitrate-A Bridge Too Far?, 21 REV. LITIG. 593, 600 (2002); See, e.g., Progressive Cas.
Ins. Co. v. C.A. Reaseguradora Nacional de Venezuela, 991 F.2d 42, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding
that a broadly worded arbitration clause can bind a non-signatory if it is not restrictively worded);
Import Export Steel Corp. v. Mississippi Valley Burge Line Co., 351 F.2d 503, 505-06 (2nd Cir. 1965)
(holding that a motion to compel is denied when the non-party does not fit into the category of parties
involved); Thyssen, Inc. v. MIV Markos N, 1999 WL 619634, at *4-*5 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that a
narrow arbitration clause applies only to the particular parties identified in the clause.); Continental
U.K., Ltd. v. Anagel Confidence Compania Navieras, S.A., 658 F. Supp. 809, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
160. Uloth & Rial, supra note 160 at 48; See, e.g., Progressive Case. Ins., 991 F.2d at 47-48 ("[A]
broadly worded arbitration clause which is not restricted to the immediate parties may be effectively
incorporated by reference into another agreement."); Thyseen, 1999 WL at *5 (stating that arbitration
clause at issue was sufficiently broad to compel arbitration.); Limonium Maritime S.A. v. Mizushima
Marinera, S.A., 1999 WL 46271, *6 (holding that the arbitration clause at issue was not limited to
signatories and could cover disputes of non-signatories).
161. Uloth & Rial, supra note 160 at 48; See, e.g., Progressive Case. Ins., 991 F.2d at 48; Upstate
Shredding, LLC v. Carlos Well Supply Co., 84 F. Supp. 357, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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arbitration against non-signatories based on an intertwinement theory also found
references in the contracts to the non-signatories.162
From this diverse array of legal precedent, it is clear that courts prefer parties
to utilize a broad arbitration clause that specifies its application to both signatories
and non-signatories claims. In addition, parties that wish to maintain the possibil-
ity of compelling a non-signatory to arbitrate its claims in the future should also
reference the non-signatory in the contract that incorporates the arbitration clause
to further solidify their basis for a motion to compel. This procedure will force a
non-signatory to recognize an arbitration clause and consent to its application
according the arbitration clauses' terms. When parties follow this clear proce-
dure, it is apparent that the arbitral process' integrity and predictability are sus-
tained and its main goals of efficiency and fairness are advanced.
From an efficiency standpoint, this method promotes efficiency by providing
parties with clear expectations concerning which potential claims will be arbi-
trated, where the provision to which reference is made has a reasonably clear and
ascertainable meaning.1 6 Businesses and parties can avoid the long procedural
process of determining whether a claim must be arbitrated and can instead move
forward towards finality in their claims. Instead of resolving an arbitration conflict
through a prolonged procedural litigation battle, clear contracting through the use
of incorporation by reference clauses will allow parties to focus on other profit-
maximizing or socially optimal ventures. As more parties' counsel incorporate
arbitration clauses by reference between two different contracts, more and more
predictability develops among arbitration clauses and contracting parties can allo-
cate risk amongst each other more efficiently. Additionally, courts will examine
similar and numerous incorporation by reference clauses and can begin to rule
precedent that provides parties and counsel with clear guidance in future contract
drafting. In sum, the incorporation by reference method is the traditional state
contract law method that best serves and promotes the arbitration process. Its ap-
plication should become the norm by parties wishing to bind a non-signatory to an
arbitral forum concerning potential claims that may arise in the future.
B. The Inefficiency of the Inapplicable Inextricable Intertwinement Theory
and Third-Party Beneficiary Status to the Case at Hand
The main problem with UMB's inextricable intertwinement theory is the lack
of any relationship between the FINRA membership agreements and any of
BOA's claims at issue. According to the "intertwining doctrine", courts may per-
mit a motion to compel when the "non-signatory's claims are intertwined with and
related to a contract containing a mandatory arbitration provision."l65 BOA's
claims for violation of the non-solicitation agreement against the Advisors were
unrelated to the underlying FINRA arbitration agreement, evidenced by the fact
162. Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc, 10 F.3d 753, 757 (11 th Cir. 1993) (quoting
McBro Planning and Dev. Co. v. Triangle Elec. Constr. Co, 741 F.2d 342, 344 (11 th Cir. 1984)).
163. See I DOMKE ON COM. ARB. § 13:4 2 (3d ed. 2003).
164. Id.
165. 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 16 (2011) ("[U]nder the "intertwining doctrine," arbitration may be or-
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that BOA was not even a FINRA member nor was there any reference to the
FINRA agreement in BOA's employment contract.166 As in Zurich, any benefits
that BOA received as a result of BOAIS's FINRA membership were too attenu-
ated and indirect to force arbitration under an estoppel theory.167 Additionally, the
estoppel doctrine does not apply because BOA was not taking inconsistent posi-
tions as the plaintiff in Washington Mutual was attempting to do.168 As efficient
and just as arbitration can be for contracting parties, utilizing a common law doc-
trine of inextricable intertwinement or third party beneficiary status to compel
arbitration in this case would promote inefficiency and an inequitable result. The
current line in jurisprudence has increasingly allowed contractual theories to over-
shadow consent and these interpretations of third party relation based on state law
contract doctrine comprise the consensual nature of arbitration.169 The Eighth
Circuit stayed true to a logical interpretation when it decided to not compel arbi-
tration against BOA.170
Based on both ex-ante and ex-post perspectives, the circumstances in this
case demonstrate the impracticability of compelling arbitration against an unas-
suming non-signatory. From an ex-ante perspective, if arbitration could be en-
forced against a non-signatory based on two unrelated contracts such as the
BOAIS' employment contract and the FINRA membership contract, businesses
and parties lose certainty in contracting their mitigation of liability for potential
ventures or activities. Businesses and parties strategize in their contracting to
avoid liability and desire certainty of in which forum a potential claim may arise.
A loosely based estoppel theory that could compel an unsuspecting party like
BOA to arbitrate, rather than the stringent test applied by Missouri and the Eighth
Circuit, forecloses this strategy.
From an ex-post perspective, if a court permits UMB and the Advisors to
compel arbitration against BOA, then many other parties would attempt to use
arbitration as a procedural tactic to avoid litigation. For example, BOA sued LMB
and the Advisors for a non-solicitation agreement violation. After BOA filed its
suit, UMB and the Advisor's counsel seemed to use every procedural tactic to
avoid the origination of this litigation.' 7' As further proof that the UMB and the
Advisor's counsel favored using arbitration as a means to avoid potential liability
in a trial forum, they made passing reference to several potential theories to com-
pel arbitration but never selected or developed one.172 The fact that the counsel did
not select one potential theory shows that there was never a true plan in place for
the FINRA form to incorporate or require arbitration with non-signatories. If
courts permit parties to compel arbitration based on an unrelated unilateral con-
tract containing an arbitration provision from which the non-signatory derives no
benefit, then the arbitration process compromises its high standard of efficiency
and fairness.
166. Bank ofAmerica, 618 F.3d at 912.
167. Zurich, 417 F.3d at 688.
168. Washington Mutual, 364 F.3d at 268.
169. Byrnes & Pollman, supra note 152 at 311.
170. Bank ofAm., 618 F.3d at 914.
171. Id. at 909-12.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Arbitration is a matter of consent between contracting parties and not a tool
used to coerce parties to an arbitral forum. If a signatory party to a contract with
an arbitration clause desires to compel a non-signatory party to arbitrate its claims
pursuant to another contract rather than pursue them in litigation, then signatory
party should utilize the incorporation by reference method. This contract method
promotes fairness and advances the fundamental goal of arbitration: efficiency.
Some federal circuit courts have recently expanded the contractual theories to
overshadow consent and expand the power to compel arbitration. These variations
in interpreting party-status based on state law theories undermine the legitimacy
of arbitration and compromise its attractiveness. Courts and parties should return
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